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1.	Introduction	
Financial disclosure (e.g. Verrecchia, 2001) is considered to be an important means of 
improving the health and liberalisation of capital markets. Widespread availability of high-
quality financial information influences the economic decision-making process by increasing 
investor confidence in the credibility of the market. Reduction in information asymmetry 
affects the process of attracting liquidity and the cost of capital (Welker, 1995). The quality of 
the capital market plays a deeper and greater role in emerging economies by increasing liquidity 
and facilitating wealth creation and trading. In order to support developing economies, recent 
decades have witnessed ambitious programmes for reform, above all regarding financial 
reporting and disclosure (ACCA, 2012). 
Although the effects of financial disclosure have been well discussed in the case of 
developed countries, few studies (Hassan et al., 2011; Abraham et al., 2015) have focused on 
emerging markets owing to difficulties in identifying the real effect of disclosures on emerging 
economies, where many institutional variables influence the growth of capital markets. This 
paper fills this gap by focusing on China, a country that, among so-called “BRIC” countries 
(Brazil, Russia, India, and China) at an advanced stage of economic development, has had a 
greater influence than others on worldwide economies in recent years (Chen and Wang, 2004). 
According to Lan et al. (2013), the securities market in China has become a major 
global stock exchange in terms of total capitalisation, trading volume and rapid growth in both 
the number and size of public companies. There are two official national exchanges in China: 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), established in 1990, and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE), founded in 1991. A-shares and B-shares can be issued in both exchange markets. The 
key distinction is that A-shares are issued for domestic investors, denominated in renminbi 
(RMB), and B-shares are issued for foreign investors, predominantly in foreign currency (US 
dollars in Shanghai and Hong Kong dollars in Shenzhen). The segmented capital stock market 
shows differences in communication, trading rules and transfer of information in the different 
exchange markets (Elshandidy et al., 2015). Chinese listed firms apply different accounting 
regulations depending on the type of security issued, whether A- or B-shares, or both. Firms 
that issue A-shares are required to comply with Chinese GAAP, firms that issue B-shares are 
required to comply with IFRS, and firms that issue both A- and B-shares are required to issue 
two sets of annual reports, one based on Chinese GAAP and the other based on IFRS (Peng 
et al., 2008). 
Although the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has continuously 
improved its laws and regulations, with many reforms concerning financial reporting 
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disclosure, the effectiveness of the information disclosure system is still underplayed (Zhang 
and Zhang, 2014). 
Despite the benefits of such reforms, which theoretically should enhance the 
performance of every capital market, many difficulties and various results are encountered in 
their actual application because of the diverse institutional contexts in which they are applied. 
Most importantly, despite promoting private ownership, international investment and 
entrepreneurial ventures, the Chinese government still maintains tight control of 
entrepreneurial activities (Elshandidy, 2014). In fact, the consideration that the state still plays 
a significant or, even dominant, role in many financial companies leads to unique 
characteristics in terms of disclosure, given the structure of the Chinese financial market. 
While the extant evidence on China is concerned largely with general financial 
disclosure (Wang, 2006; Wang, 2009; Wu, 2007), the quality of risk reporting by financial firms 
is still empirically debatable. Regarding risk reporting in other contexts, over the last decade a 
growing literature has developed on investors’ risk perceptions of capital markets through 
observation of the effects of risk disclosure (Kravet and Muslu, 2013), and it is commonly 
recognised that the motivations for risk related information are explained by agency theory in 
terms of the capacity of risk disclosure to decrease information asymmetries (Oliveira et al., 
2011). 
Its effects on market liquidity are well documented in developed countries (Miihkinen, 
2013; Campbell et al., 2014; Elshandidy and Neri, 2015), but less attention has been given to 
emerging markets. This is even more important if we consider the situation of financial 
companies listed in the Chinese market: factors like the high percentage of state ownership 
and the low percentage of negotiable securities (OECD, 2011) make the risk disclosure of 
financial companies in the Chinese context fundamental for investors and analysts. 
This paper fills this gap by studying the main determinants of the risk disclosure quality 
of financial firms listed in China’s A-shares of the SSE market for the years 2013, 2014 and 
2015, and then observes the impact of risk disclosure quality on market liquidity. The paper 
considers the SSE market for its characteristics and dimension (Luo et al., 2009): many 
companies are state-owned and responsible for China's economic growth, and at the end of 
2015 this market showed RMB 53.1 trillion of capitalisation. Furthermore, the majority of the 
financial firms are listed on the SSE while small companies and few financial companies are 
listed on the SZSE. 
Our paper constructs risk disclosure quality scores on the basis of manual content 
analysis in order to achieve a reasonable level of accuracy and validity. Risk disclosure quality 
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is measured by analysing five main dimensions in annual report narratives: quantity, 
depth_qualitative, depth_quantitative, outlook_profile and coverage (Miihkinen, 2012). 
Quality is then tested against the firm characteristics of size, risk, capital structure and growth. 
The paper also analyses the possible impact of risk disclosure quality on market liquidity 
(Elshandidy and Neri, 2015) in order to understand whether disclosing more risk information 
really improves the attraction of liquidity in emerging markets and counteracts the fact that 
“heavy government regulation affects prices of different financial assets” (Chan et al., 2007). 
Since the A- and B-share markets have different disclosure levels (Elshandidy, 2014), 
this paper focuses on the A-share market in order to reflect the influence of Chinese 
regulations. By 2014, A-share listed companies, banks, insurance enterprises, securities 
enterprises and central state-owned enterprises had already adopted the New People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) GAAP (KPMG, 2014). Furthermore, as described in the 
background section, the A-share market is the most important segment of the Chinese market 
because it is one that is ideated to attract more capital (domestic and foreign). Moreover, the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) instated a new set of regulations in 2013 to 
comply with Basel III. The sample covers the years 2013-2015 for several reasons, including 
the interest in studying a recent period where the market becomes more mature to apply risk 
regulations which have been implemented in the Chinese market. Additionally, it allows us to 
observe any potential impact for the most recent financial crisis in the Chinese market in 2014. 
This is particularly important as it has been stated (Carpenter et al., 2015) that after a rocky 
first decade from 1990 to 2000, China’s stock market earned a reputation as a casino 
manipulated by speculators and insiders.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. Firstly, it draws on 
previous studies (Elshandidy et al., 2013; Miihkinen, 2012) to identify the influence of firm 
characteristics on risk disclosure quality in China and how risk disclosure may influence 
market liquidity of an emerging market. This will be of interest to investors, since there has 
been no significant previous research of the quality of risk disclosure practices in China. The 
time period of three years will be helpful in trying to identify any patterns of behaviour in the 
year before the crisis, in the one during and in the one after the crisis. The importance of this 
paper is its provision of evidence on several reporting incentives concerning not only firms’ 
quantity, but also firms’ quality of risk reporting. This will function as a set of guidelines for 
investors’ decision making, and may also support activism for reforms and the enhancement 
of regulations in China in order to make the market more efficient. 
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Section 2 sets out the background to Chinese market regulation. Section 3 reviews the 
previous literature and develops our hypotheses. In Section 4, we introduce our methodology 
and describe our findings. Section 5 discusses the empirical findings and illustrates further 
analysis and Section 6 draws conclusions, discusses the limitations of the work, and suggests 
areas for future research. 
 
2.	Background	and	regulation	of	the	Chinese	market	
2.1 Background 
In June 2015, the Shanghai stock market faced a crisis that caused a reassessment of a market 
which, in the previous 12 months, had registered a 150 percent increase in stock value, but 
this rise was not accompanied by a similar growth in earnings. Shenzhen, the other Chinese 
stock market, experienced a strong reduction in value. Furthermore, the Chinese financial 
market is valued at only around 40 percent of GDP, while in highly developed economies this 
ratio exceeds 100 percent. At the end of December 2015, the total market capitalisation of 
companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
amounted to RMB 53.1 trillion, ranking second in the world to the United States. 
Even with this rise, Shanghai’s market index has been faced with poor performances 
since 2012 compared with other stock indexes (UK stocks moved up by 5.8 percent for 
instance). This behaviour is mostly due to the specific characteristics of the Chinese stock 
market that is still underdeveloped (Luo et al., 2009). The government made use of it as a 
fundraising tool for funding state-owned companies with a high percentage of listed 
companies that resulted in being state controlled. Furthermore, China’s stock market 
developed under a repressed financial market. Finally, China’s stock market grew in a weak 
legal environment that did not provide much protection to shareholders. 
Although La Porta et al. (2008) identify China’s legal system as originating from 
German civil law, a particular characteristic of China’s legal tradition is that the judicial system 
is not independent of the government’s administrative system (Chen, 2003). Furthermore, 
private property rights were formulated by China’s legislative system for the first time in 
March 2004 at the second session of the Tenth National People’s Congress Meeting. However, 
there is as yet no clear definition or explanation of private property rights in the Chinese stock 
market, and government violation of private property rights is not unusual (Sanders and Chen, 
2005). Concentrated state ownership, unclear laws governing private property rights, and a 
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lack of judicial independence continue to characterise China’s market, protecting state 
interests over the rights of individuals.  
Additionally, given the stock segmentation, China’s stock market is not immediately 
accessible for foreign investors (even though the picture has changed rapidly in the last years) 
and this affects China’s stock market integration.1 On the SSE, in fact two types of stock are 
issued: A-shares and B-shares. A-shares are priced in the local RMB currency, while B-shares 
are quoted in US dollars. Trading in A-shares is initially restricted to domestic investors, while 
B-shares are available to both domestic and (with restrictions) foreign investors. From 2002, 
China permitted foreign institutional investors to purchase bonds or stocks listed in the 
Chinese A-share market and this constitutes the main factor that makes A-shares the most 
important segment in China’s stock market, especially compared with B-shares that from the 
beginning were ideated to attract limited foreign investment. 
 
2.2 Regulations 
As stated above, the most important anomaly in the Chinese stock market is the government’s 
restrictions, which create a lot of issues for the transparency and equality conditions for the 
stakeholders. In the last two decades, SSE and SZSE have obtained important improvements 
for the development rates and the reform process of the stock markets that developed the 
running of capital markets, created market-based mechanisms and created the conditions for 
the listing of new companies. The legislator had to work on various reforms including 
regulation of corporate ownership and the creation of the conditions for an effective 
corporate governance system. 
In order to manage conflicts between the government and other shareholders, in 
January 2001, the CSRC issued a Code of Corporate Governance of Listed Firms, revised in 
October 2005. The Code aims to safeguard minority shareholders’ interests by ensuring that 
controlling shareholders do not take decisions detrimental to other shareholders’ legal rights 
and interests. In addition, the Code underlines the relevance of timeliness and accuracy of 
corporate information disclosures. It recommends that listed firms should not just disclose 
compulsory information mandated by regulations, but should provide other information that 
may be useful to shareholders’ and stakeholders’ decision-making processes. 
                                                 
1 Malkiel (2007) affirms that “one of the most distinctive features of China’s stock market it is an alphabet soup 
of different kinds of Chinese shares”. 
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The PBC (People’s Bank of China) then issued General Provisions on the Regulation 
of Financial Institutions, which was the first comprehensive law on the regulation of financial 
institutions in China. In order to improve transparency, in 2002, the PBC issued Provisional 
Rules on Commercial Banks’ Information. These rules recommend detailed items in 
disclosing banks’ financial risk management and corporate governance reports within their 
annual reports. 
Effective from 2005, the CBRC published the Guidance on Market Risk Management 
of Commercial Banks. This guidance explains the responsibilities of board members and 
management for control of market risk, and prescribes the set-up of market risk management 
departments, control policies and procedures. Since International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) were prescribed for listed Chinese companies in 2007, the CBRC has 
required the use of the new standards. In 2007, it issued Rules on Commercial Banks’ 
Information Disclosure, which establish obligations regarding the content and form of 
detailed published information that commercial banks must disclose regarding their financial 
position, risks and risk management system, and corporate governance. 
In 2009, China restructured the management and supervision of stock markets (Rules 
on Supervision over Securities Companies, the Rules on Risk Disposal of Securities 
Companies and The Rules of Contents and Format of Information Disclosure by Companies 
Offering Securities, to mention some of the main ones), and CBRC released Guidance on the 
Management of Liquidity Risk of Commercial Banks. This document illustrates the principles, 
management responsibilities, requirement for structures and methods of liquidity risk 
management. 
Chinese regulators have closely followed the development of the Basel Accords and 
have shown a strong will to integrate international regulatory rules into Chinese regulatory 
practices, with adaptation to market features. In 2008, the CBRC finalised the Basel II 
implementation in China through the publication of five sets of guidance: Guidance on the 
Classification of Credit Risk Exposure in Commercial Banks’ Banking Book, Guidance on the 
Supervision of Internal Rating-Based Credit Risk Calculation of Commercial Banks, Guidance 
on the Risk Capital Calculation of Specialized Lending of Commercial Banks, Guidance on 
the Credit Risk Minimization in Risk Capital Calculation of Commercial Banks and Guidance 
on Risk Capital Calculation of Operational Risk of Commercial Banks. In 2010, the CBRC 
released the Implementation of Four New Supervisory Instruments (Draft Discussion) to 
merge Basel III’s new tools of capital adequacy, anti-cyclical capital charge, liquidity and bank 
regulation into the Chinese regulatory framework. 
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These requirements aim to address the shortcomings exposed over the course of the 
financial crisis. The new regulatory guidelines have higher capital requirements, including a 4 
percent leverage ratio, stricter loan-loss provision rules and better liquidity rules (Lee and Chih, 
2013). The CBRC seeks to optimise the methods used by banks to calculate risk assets, and 
to widen the range of risks covered by regulatory capital (Sekine, 2011). It requires banks to 
retain a loan provision ratio of at least 2.5 percent. Banks must also provide a minimum of 
150 percent coverage ratio, which may lead to a decrease in profitability and an increase in 
capital pressure. Under the new rules, the liquidity ratio is set at a minimum of 100 percent 
(Lee and Chih, 2013).  
In 2012, the CBRC issued the “Capital Rules for Commercial Banks” and released 
additional regulatory schemes and guidelines to promote the implementation of the capital 
methods and the alignments with market driven systems. China’s Basel III provisions seek to 
address weaknesses in micro-level supervision. They also aim to stabilise the financial system 
for future economic growth by introducing a macro-prudential overlay to the regulatory 
framework. In 2013, China adopted reforms regarding corporate disclosure rules which have 
modified the landscape considerably, and in December 2015 the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) rolled out a series of money market funds provisions to strike a balance 
between the need for innovation and risk minimisation in the capital markets, with the main 
aims being to improve disclosure and transparency. 
 
3.	Literature	review	and	research	hypotheses	
3.1 Literature review 
As an emerging economy, China’s capital market is not as efficient as capital markets in 
developed countries, nor is its regulatory environment as mature as those in developed 
countries. Previous studies have found that both individual and institutional investors in China 
are less experienced and more restricted than their counterparts in developed countries, such 
as the US (Bailey et al., 2009; Deng and Xu, 2011). 
China’s stock markets suffer from serious information asymmetry problems, high 
governance-related agency costs, particularly for state-owned companies (Gul et al. 2010), and 
weak-form efficiency concerns (Lee et al., 2001). This may influence investors’ decision 
making based on their understanding of financial reports, and may also affect firms’ 
disclosures of risk information. As a result of the structural situation of the market, firms may 
not be willing to disclose private information to the market (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). From 
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the market perspective, however, investors always require more information. This creates 
conflicting demands for risk information. High-quality disclosure of financial data provides 
valuable information to investors (Healy and Palepu, 2001). According to a study by Miihkinen 
(2012), in the presence of detailed risk disclosure standards and guidelines, firms disclose more 
qualitative risk information and action plans relating to economic impacts, which improves 
the quality of firms’ overall risk reviews. 
Previous studies have also confirmed that firm characteristics are related to corporate 
risk disclosure. Elshandidy et al. (2013) test the relationship between risk disclosures and firm 
characteristics. Their results confirm that profitable firms are more likely to reveal 
comprehensive and specific risk information to investors, which decreases information 
asymmetry and gives investors the opportunity to make accurate pricing decisions. Elshandidy 
et al. (2013) also reveal that larger firms are more likely to exhibit higher levels of aggregated 
risk disclosures. Deumes and Knechel (2008) confirm that a firm’s financial leverage is 
positively associated with the content of its risk disclosure. In testing firm risk against risk 
information disclosed, Linsley and Shrives (2005) suggest that the provision of forward-
looking risk information will be especially valuable to investors. Their work confirms that 
there is a significant relationship between a firm’s reputation for high risk and its disclosure 
of high-quality risk information. 
Elshandidy et al. (2013) find that risk disclosure is associated positively with systematic 
and financing risks and risk-adjusted returns, confirming managers’ incentive (agency and 
signalling) theories suggesting that managers are motivated to provide higher (Ball et al., 2003; 
Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Leuz et al., 2003) levels of information to reduce information 
asymmetry, so affecting both quality and quantity levels of disclosure. In terms of risk 
disclosure, Abraham and Cox (2007) suggest as well that managers could be motivated in 
providing additional risk disclosure to reduce information asymmetry. 
Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) find that firms with valid risk disclosures have 
lower risk premiums. When risk disclosures are made voluntarily, as opposed to being 
mandatory, risk premiums also tend to be lower. In addition, improved information disclosure 
increases market liquidity because investors are less likely to feel uninformed and artificially 
raise prices (Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). Miihkinen (2012) confirms that detailed and 
regulated disclosure standards improve firms’ risk disclosure quality under IFRS. Information 
asymmetry is a long-standing concern to both investors and regulators. The results of a 
research by Verrecchia et al. (2001) show that, in imperfectly competitive markets, the degree 
of information asymmetry is related to market illiquidity and cost of capital. Consequently, 
 9 
Campbell et al. (2014) conclude that, when the bid-ask price is used as a proxy for market 
liquidity, the risk factor is positively related to a reduction in information asymmetry. Other 
studies reveal that there are significant correlations between trading volume and investors’ 
uncertainty and diversity of opinion (Bamber and Cheon, 1995; Barron, 1995). 
 
3.2 Research hypotheses: Main determinants of risk disclosure quality 
3.2.1 Firm size 
Many studies have evaluated firm size in relation to disclosure. It is considered to be one of 
the most important indicators of disclosure levels (Abraham and Cox, 2007). According to 
agency theory, larger firms tend to incur lower disclosure costs than smaller firms. Zadeh and 
Eskandari (2012) confirm the importance of firm size for the level of disclosure in annual 
reports. On the basis of past studies, the association between the two variables may be either 
negative or positive. Kou and Hussain (2007) find a negative relationship between firm size 
and disclosures, whereas Linsley and Shrives’ (2006) work supports a positive relationship 
between the two. Other studies have also found that firm size is considerably and positively 
associated with disclosure levels (Chavent et al., 2006; Hassan et al., 2011). 
According to signalling theory, non-disclosure may project an image of attempting to 
hide bad news. For this reason, larger listed firms benefit from disclosing more information, 
as this protects their reputation (McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993). Risk reporting literature 
highlights no significant impact of firm size on the quantity and/or quality of risk disclosure 
(Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004), on negative relation (Campbell et al., 2014) or positive influence 
on aggregated disclosure (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007). In a study of 
559 Chinese firms in 2002, Huafang and Jianguo (2007) find that larger firms show greater 
disclosure, while Li et al.’s (2008) study of all Chinese listed firms with A-shares in the China 
Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database finds a positive relationship 
between size and disclosure. Therefore, the first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1: Larger Chinese firms in the financial sector tend to disclose more and 
higher-quality risk disclosure information to the market. 
3.2.2 Risk 
Based on signalling theory, managers’ disclosure of more risk-related information reduces 
investor uncertainty. It may decrease the firm’s perceived risk because an open disclosure 
strategy should result in a better assessment of the firm’s future performance (Jorgensen and 
Kirscenheiter, 2003). Furthermore, agency and signalling theories indicate that managers of 
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high-risk firms have more incentives to increase disclosure of voluntary risk information 
(Abraham and Cox, 2007). Firms also benefit from this practice because it helps to avoid 
unnecessary losses, especially for high-risk firms. According to Elshandidy and Neri (2015), 
firms with higher risks usually disclose more information in order to avoid misunderstandings 
by investors. This finding is consistent with studies by Elshandidy et al. (2013) and Deumes 
(2008), who affirm that markets may misinterpret firms’ conditions due to high risks. Lam and 
Du’s (2004) analysis of the Chinese market provides evidence that disclosure may be 
associated with lower variance in risk-adjusted returns and risk, while Firth et al. (2007) find a 
positive relationship between risk profile and the level of earnings disclosure in the Chinese 
market. Finally, investors also require high-risk firms to present their methods for evaluation 
of risk drivers in order to gain deeper insights before making decisions. Given the above 
considerations, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Chinese financial firms with higher risks are more likely to provide 
high-quality risk disclosures. 
3.2.3 Capital structure 
The capital structure of a firm indicates the financial risk it faces and how it manages its 
financial resources in business operations. According to signalling theory, managers in firms 
heavily financed by debt tend to disclose more information to satisfy the needs of creditors 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Considering the agency theory perspective, creditors of high 
leveraged companies should have high incentives to recommend management to disclose 
more information (Amran et al., 2009). Managers even tend to signal their appropriate control 
of higher risk to investors. This is supported by Elshandidy et al. (2013), who find a positive 
relationship between risk level and risk disclosure. They also confirm that risky firms are likely 
to disclose more information than less risky firms in order to avoid market misinterpretations. 
However, some previous studies of the possible association between the level of risk and the 
amount of risk disclosure have discovered an insignificant association (Linsley and Shrives, 
2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007). In the Chinese context, previous studies (Ferguson et al., 2002; 
Xiao et al., 2008) have highlighted a positive relationship between the leverage and disclosures 
of Chinese listed companies. This knowledge leads us to formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The capital structure of Chinese financial firms is positively associated 
with risk disclosure quality. 
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3.2.4 Growth 
High-growth firms are likely to have greater information asymmetry and higher agency costs 
(Gaver and Gaver, 1993). Gul and Leung (2004) and Lim et al. (2007) claim that companies 
with a high growth potential need to disclose more information to the market to signal that 
the stock is not overvalued. Considering risk disclosure, Elshandidy et al. (2013) hypothesise 
this positive relationship but their findings do not confirm this expectation. To measure the 
growth factor, we use the book-to-market ratio (BTM) that represents a measure of a firm’s 
opportunities for growth (Gebhardt et al., 2001). A high BTM equity indicates a high-risk 
premium and weak future growth due to greater risk distress (Griffin and Lemmon, 2002). 
Investors prefer firms with a high market value in relation to the book value of their equity. 
A high BTM ratio indicates high potential growth for the firm. Campbell et al.’s (2014) study 
of BTM value suggests that BTM and future growth have a direct positive or negative impact 
on a firm’s stock return. Cheng and Courtenay (2006) find evidence of a positive relationship 
between BTM ratio and risk disclosure, while Liu (2015) shows a negative relationship 
between BTM and forward-looking information in the Chinese market context. This 
knowledge leads us to formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: There is no association between book-to-market ratio and quality of 
risk disclosure for Chinese financial firms. 
3.2.5 Market liquidity and quality of risk disclosure 
The market-efficiency coefficient (MEC) expresses a market’s price fluidity. Markets with high 
liquidity are more equipped to support changes in price (Welker, 1995). Therefore, a price-
based measurement is used in this paper to determine market liquidity. The higher levels of 
disclosure should decrease information asymmetry between current and prospective 
shareholders, and so disclosure could increase the liquidity of a security (Easley and O’Hara, 
2004).  
Lang and Lundholm (1993) find that performance variability affects disclosure levels 
negatively, recognising in this way an association between the volatility of market returns and 
general disclosure levels. Alexander (1996) claims that companies with more volatile earnings 
will probably furnish greater disclosure in their annual reports. Ascioglu et al. (2005) instead 
illustrate indirect impact between disclosure quality and market liquidity, analysing the 
relationship between market liquidity and audit compensation. 
Furthermore, investors and analysts could include risk information in their price 
choice and recommendations and increase market liquidity working on information 
asymmetry (Campbell et al., 2014). In the American market, Linsmeier et al. (2002) find a 
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decline in trading volume sensitivity associated with the requirements provided by FRR No. 
48 in terms of market risk disclosures to be provided to investors. Elshandidy and Neri (2015) 
find that risk disclosure practices (mandatory and voluntary) provided by UK firms 
significantly and negatively influence the bid-ask spread, suggesting that this information 
reduces information asymmetry between market participants and improves market liquidity. 
They find that just voluntary, rather mandatory, risk disclosure provided by Italian firms 
improves the market liquidity by reducing information asymmetry.  
Under the requirement of Chinese Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (PRC 
GAAP), audited annual reports of listed firms in China must be available to public users by 
30 April, four months after the end of the fiscal year. Consistent with Miihkinen (2013) and 
Elshandidy and Neri (2015), this paper calculates the average of the relative spreads over a 
three-month period, from the beginning of May to the end of July. In order to arrive at a 
three-month mean of relative spreads, economists typically calculate the difference between 
the daily ask and bid prices. This is then divided by the average of the daily ask and bid prices. 
No significant research has shown that this finding is also true in the Chinese market. This 
knowledge leads us to formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: There is no association between market liquidity and risk disclosure 
quality for Chinese financial firms. 
4.	Sample	and	methodology	
4.1 Sample selection and data collection 
Our sample was based on financial firms listed in the A-shares market of the SSE for the fiscal 
years 2013, 2014 and 2015. Based on a list generated by Thomson One Banker, 102 financial 
firms were listed in the SSE up to 2015. For this paper, the SSE market was chosen rather 
than the SZSE because it is the most important market, has the greatest market capitalisation 
and encompasses the most important Chinese financial institutions, including most of China’s 
major banks. Therefore, the sample featured 102 financial firms listed on the SSE during the 
research period. These firms publish their annual reports according to PRC GAAP. Two 
organisations were omitted because they were not listed during the period of observation, so 
the final sample comprised 100 firms. All included organisations have a fiscal year end of 31 
December, and measurement of market liquidity and observations were pooled for the whole 
period. 
Annual reports for the above firms were collected from Thomson One Banker and 
from companies’ websites. Data collection for risk disclosure quality focused on annual 
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reports, since these are the primary source of information for investors (Miihkinen, 2013). 
Corporate governance data were collected from Orbis and manually from annual reports, 
while financial data for each firm, such as share price, market value and leverage, were 
collected from DataStream. 
4.2 Identification of variables: indicators of risk disclosure quality 
In measuring the quality of risk disclosure and consistent with Miihkinen (2012), four 
measurement indicators are considered in this paper: quantity of disclosures, coverage of 
disclosures, and the semantic properties of depth and outlook. More detailed examples are 
included in Appendix 1. 
4.2.1 Risk disclosure quantity 
Within the hundreds of pages included in annual reports, users may find it too difficult to 
locate specific risk-related information. This is because the limited amount of relevant 
information is diluted within a thick annual report covering a broad range of other data. This 
paper uses the number of sentences concerning risk disclosure that appear in the annual report 
as a proxy for risk disclosure quantity. Thus, it is measured as: 
QUANTITYi = ln (total number of sentences containing risk disclosure) 
4.2.2 Risk disclosure coverage 
In order to improve portfolio investment decisions, investors prefer companies to disclose a 
certain level of risk information in their annual reports (Solomon et al., 2000). The topics 
identified are financial risks, damage risks and risk management (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). 
Therefore, it is vital to measure the coverage of risk information contained in these reports. 
As suggested by Miihkinen (2012), this paper uses the Herfindahl index to identify the 
concentration of risk topics in corporate disclosures. 
COVERAGEi= [(1/H)/Number of main risk topics] 
where H = ∑ ௜ܲଶ௡௜  measures the concentration of risk topics, and Pi represents the proportion 
of risk disclosure sentences on topic i. In order to increase the Herfindahl index value so that 
it displays more comprehensive coverage information, this paper uses the inverse of H. 
4.2.3 Risk disclosure depth 
The semantic properties of information disclosed in corporate communications include depth 
and outlook profile. Depth concerns the content of disclosed risk information which predicts 
the economic impact on future performance. Disclosure depth gives users a better 
understanding of firms. The empirical indicators are as follows: 
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DEPTH	_	QUALITATIVEi ൌ ݈݊෍qualitative
௞௝
௝ୀଵ
݆ 
where kj is the number of risk information sentences in the annual report, and qualitativej 
equals 1 if the risk information sentence j in the annual report of firm i contains qualitative 
information about expected future performance, and otherwise 0. 
DEPTH	_	QUANTITATIVEi ൌ ݈݊෍quantitative
௞௝
௝ୀଵ
݆ 
where kj equals the total number of sentences containing risk-related information in the annual 
report, and quantitativej equals 1 if the risk information sentence j in the annual report of firm 
i contains quantitative information about expected future performance, and otherwise 0. 
4.2.4 Outlook profile 
As one of the semantic properties of risk disclosure, outlook profile expresses how firms 
disclose their planned approach to risk (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). Risk disclosures explain 
the existence of risks, the future expectations of the firm and the risk management approach 
adopted by the firm. The empirical indicators are as follows: 
OUTLOOK	_	PROFILEi ൌ ݈݊෍acp
௞௝
௝ୀଵ
݆ 
where kj equals the number of sentences referring to risk in the annual report, and acpj equals 
1 if the risk information sentence j in the annual report of firm i contains information about 
the risk management approach, and otherwise 0. 
4.2.5 Composite quality of risk disclosure 
Based on the factor analysis method, composite quality of risk disclosure is used to examine 
relationships between multiple variables by combining data into a smaller set. This measure is 
used to summarise the five previously-mentioned individual quality indicators as follows: 
QUALITY = the score of the principal component with the highest eigenvalue 
Content analysis is used in this paper to measure the quality of risk disclosure. In 
quantitative research, content analysis locates predefined terms or phrases in texts and draws 
conclusions based on their presence. For example, some researchers use sentences or lines as 
the unit of analysis (Beattie et al., 2004). There are two different methods of content analysis: 
automated and manual. Researchers may select either method according to its usefulness to 
their particular study. For instance, Elshandidy et al. (2013) adopt an automated method, 
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whereas Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Abraham and Cox (2007) opt for manual content 
analysis. This paper uses the manual content analysis method, also applied in Elshandidy et al. 
(2013). Many recent reviews (Miihkinen, 2012) have emphasised that the dimensions selected 
to measure risk disclosure quality are crucial. Analysis is useless unless the primary variables 
are measured with a sufficient degree of accuracy. Thus, the manual content analysis method 
is preferred in this paper due to its precision (Hassan and Marston, 2010). 
Nevertheless, content analysis suffers from limitations. In this paper, two main 
weaknesses are identified. Firstly, there is inherent subjectivity in determining the coding 
scheme. The manual content analysis developed in this paper ensures a high level of reliability. 
Secondly, labour-intensive analysis of data has a limited capability. For this reason, only a small 
number of companies are investigated. The potential gains from this micro-level analysis are 
expected to outweigh the above limitations. 
Manual content analysis is subject to individually tailored procedures. The results 
reported have the potential to be artificially inflated (Krippendorff, 1980) and affected by 
subjectivity. This inevitable subjectivity is its main weakness, as discussed by researchers such 
as Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Abraham and Cox (2007). In order to avoid this weakness, 
there are two ways to test the reliability and validity of risk disclosure quality scores. One 
method is to select an independent second coder to perform manual content analysis in order 
to test the level of agreement between raters. The second rater selects 15 samples randomly 
from the sample list and examines the extent to which the risk-related sentences in the annual 
report narratives are captured in the final word list. The results from the second rater are then 
compared with the original results to test reliability and validity. This method confirms that 
the manual content analysis used in this paper is successful because the similarity between the 
two results is above 80 percent. The second method of testing reliability uses Cronbach’s 
Alpha to measure how well a dataset captures an underlying construct (Elshandidy et al., 2013). 
If the result approaches 1, this means that the coding is reliable. If the result is closer to 0, 
there is no agreement other than what would be expected by chance. The Cronbach’s Alpha 
is 94 percent for the risk disclosure quality scores in this paper. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the risk disclosure score computed using manual content analysis is internally consistent 
and acceptable. 
4.2.6 Firm characteristics 
Firm size is measured as the log of total assets, and risk is measured using the beta. The beta 
is a covariance figure which expresses a firm’s market return compared with a 23- to 25-month 
market index. Capital structure is measured as the log of leverage, which is the ratio of total 
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debt to total equity, and growth is measured as the ratio of the book value of equity divided 
by its market value. 
4.2.7 Corporate governance 
Five corporate governance variables are used in this paper as control variables: board size, 
board independence, CEO duality, state ownership and audit quality. 
Regarding board size, measured as the total number of directors on the board at the 
fiscal year end, some work (i.e. Elshandidy and Neri, 2015) recommends that larger boards 
could be more likely to decrease actual agency costs by aligning different possible conflicts of 
interest, but previous literature also indicates that a larger board size results in less effective 
communication (Gul and Leung, 2004). However, some researchers disagree. A study by 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) shows that there is no significant relationship between board 
size and risk disclosure. In the Chinese context, Firth et al. (2007) find that a greater board size 
corresponds to a greater level of earnings disclosure information. 
Board independence, calculated as the ratio of the total number of independent non-
executive directors (NEDs) to the total number of directors, has also been highlighted by 
previous research (i.e. Gul and Leung, 2004) as a potentially significant variable. Agency theory 
argues that independent directors are likely to mitigate agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders, given that they have no linkages with the representative shareholders and should 
be beneficial for matching companies` targets. Peng (2004) analysed a sample of China’s 
largest public companies and found that increasing the percentage of independent directors 
led to higher sales growth, attributing this result to the role these directors play in securing 
resources for the firm as part of Chinese business networks. According to contract theory, 
NEDs may stimulate the disclosure of risk information and reduce information asymmetry 
(Abraham and Cox, 2007). Moreover, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) find a significant and 
positive relationship between the number of NEDs and the level of risk disclosure. In the 
Chinese context, Huafang and Jianguo (2007) find that the level of disclosure increases with 
a greater percentage of independent directors on the board. 
Another measure of corporate governance is provided by chief executive officer 
(CEO) duality, a dummy variable counted as 1 if the CEO and chairman are the same person, 
and 0 otherwise. According to agency theory, the positions of CEO and chairman should be 
separate, which should decrease agency costs and improve corporate governance performance 
(Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). Since one of the responsibilities of the chairman of the board is 
to monitor the performance of the CEO, a conflict of interests exists if an individual holds 
both positions. This may negatively affect the interests of shareholders, and the board may 
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not be sufficiently balanced. The findings of previous studies highlight either a negative impact 
of CEO duality on the level of disclosure (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007), or they are mixed: 
Elshandidy et al. (2013), for instance, find a non-significant association between role duality 
and risk disclosure. 
We take into consideration state ownership, measured as 1 if the company is ultimately 
owned by the state and 0 otherwise. In fact, even if an increasing number of public companies 
are owned by non-government entities, many companies on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
are partially or ultimately owned by the central or local governments. State-owned firms tend 
to be perceived as suffering from more severe information asymmetry, agency problems and 
adverse selection costs. Wang et al. (2008) indeed find the level of disclosure to be positively 
related to the proportion of state ownership. In contrast, Ferguson et al. (2002) dispute that 
because red-chip firms face a more uncertain situation and stronger competition costs on the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange, they provide less information than H-share firms. The higher 
the proportion of state ownership, the more severe the agency problem and the more 
voluntary disclosure there is to alleviate that problem and lower the cost of capital. Lan et al. 
(2013) find that the disclosure level initially decreases with state ownership, but after a certain 
point, it increases with an increase in state ownership. 
We also control for firm audit quality, measured as 1 if the audit firm is one of the Big 
Four and 0 otherwise. In fact, according to agency theory, firms may use voluntary disclosure 
to reduce agency costs, and the use of external audit firms may boost this effect (Barako et al., 
2006). Financial reports audited by highly-reputable external audit firms increase the 
confidence of investors (Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). From an empirical perspective, investors 
require a high-quality audit if firms have high risk. This is because audited reports increase the 
accountability of managers (Datar et al., 1991). According to Camfferman and Cooke (2002), 
there is a positive relationship between audit quality and risk disclosures. This indication has 
also been confirmed in the Chinese context: Wang et al. (2008) illustrate that the use of large 
auditors is clearly related to increased levels of disclosure. 
4.2.8 Market liquidity 
Share price volatility and trading volume are used to test market liquidity. The standard 
deviation of daily stock prices is used to indicate share price volatility. In order to arrive at a 
figure for trading volume, the daily trading volume is divided by the number of outstanding 
shares. 
Panel A of Table I provides descriptive statistics for the continuous variables 
mentioned in Section 3. These include risk disclosure, market indicators, firm characteristics 
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and corporate governance. This paper winsorises the variables at the first and 99th percentiles. 
Table I gives the number of observations, the mean, standard deviation, lower quartile, median 
and upper quartile. The three dummy variables are CEO duality, audit quality and state 
ownership. Panel B displays their frequencies. 
The mean and median statistics for QAN and DQAL are quite close in value. This 
shows that the two variables are symmetrically distributed. 
[Insert Table I] 
 
4.3 Empirical model development 
This paper measures the impact of firm characteristics on risk disclosure quality and the 
influence of risk disclosure quality on market liquidity through the use of ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression, as suggested by Elshandidy and Neri (2015). This is measured by analysing 
narratives in annual reports. Thus, the estimation model is represented as: 
Equation 1: (QAL) it = β0 + β1FZ it + β2RS it +β3CS it +β4BTMit +β5BSit +β6BIit +β7CDit +β8AQit 
+ β9STit + ߝ݅ 
where (QAL) it is the score of the principal component with the highest eigenvalue for the five 
main risk disclosure indicators (quantity, depth_qualitative, depth_quantitative, 
outlook_profile and coverage) of firm i at time t.  
The variables in Equation 1 include firm size (FZ), risk (RS), capital structure (CS) and 
growth (BTM). The control variables were selected based on previous studies (Elshandidy et 
al., 2013). This paper uses board size (BS), board independence (BI), CEO duality (CD), audit 
quality (AQ) and state ownership (ST) as control variables. 
Equation 2: (ML) it+1 = β0 + β1QAL it + β2RS it +β3CS it +β4BTMit +β5SPVit +β6TVit +β7BSit 
+β8BIit +β9CDit +β10AQit+β11STit + ߝ݅ 
where (ML) it+1 is the three-month average of relative spreads from the beginning of May to 
the end of July for firm i. 
Equation 2 tests market liquidity through analysis of share price volatility (SPV) and 
trading value (TV). In this equation, firm characteristic variables (RS, CS and BTM) and 
corporate governance variables (BS, BI, CD, AQ and ST) are used as control variables. 
Appendix 2 explains the definitions of these variables, their sources and their codes. 
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5.	Empirical	results	
5.1 Correlation analysis 
Table II shows the results of the Pearson correlation coefficient and significant values for all 
continuous variables. The correlation relationship and multicollinearity problems between all 
continuous variables are tested. The correlation coefficient indicates a significant relationship 
between risk disclosure quantity and quality scores. This suggests that firms with higher-
quality risk disclosures also release more comprehensive risk information. 
Consistent with Miihkinen (2012), the positive correlation between quality and 
quantity of risk disclosure reveals that quantity is a good proxy for quality in assessing narrative 
disclosures in annual reports. There is a negative correlation between QAL and COV, and a 
high positive correlation between QAL and the other four quality indicators. This result is 
consistent with factor analysis, which shows that, excluding COV, all quality indicators have 
a high positive factor loading. 2  For market liquidity, the correlation coefficient for risk 
disclosure quality and quantity is very low. This indicates that there is no significant effect of 
market liquidity on the quality or quantity of risk disclosure. 
Firm size (FS) and board size (BS) are significantly correlated with both risk disclosure 
quantity and quality scores, and the coefficients show a positive relationship. Also, risk profile 
(RS) and capital structure (CS) highlight some relationships but not at a high level, indicating 
that these factors are probably not the main ones that should be taken into consideration for 
the present analysis. 
In terms of market indicators, market liquidity (ML) shows no significant relationship, 
while trading volume (TV) and share price volatility (SPV) provide significant results even if 
the relationships with the other variables are not very pronounced.  
The remaining variables show no significant correlation, indicating that probably at 
this stage of the evolution of the Chinese market, the governance factors are not the main 
ones to be considered when discussing risk reporting disclosure. Furthermore, recent 
disclosure reforms, liberalisation and opening to foreign investors are ongoing issues that will 
produce more effective results in the years to come.  
[Insert Table II] 
                                                 
2 The factor loadings of QUANTITY, COVERAGE, DEPTH_QUANTITATIVE, DEPTH_QUALITATIVE, 
and OUTLOOK_PROFILE are 0.983, -0.111, 0.853, 0.979 and 0.616, respectively. The first factor accounts for 
76.7 percent of the total variance in the quality indicator of risk disclosure. 
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5.2 Empirical results 
This section presents the OLS regression results for all variables discussed in the previous 
sections. Tables III and IV display the regression results based on the dependent variables of 
risk disclosure quality and its five quality dimensions. Table V shows the regression results 
based on the dependent variable of market liquidity. Tables III and IV present the empirical 
results for the risk disclosure score compared with the hypotheses. Excluding COV, firm size 
is significantly and positively associated with all other dimensions of risk disclosure quality 
and quantity. Furthermore, the positive coefficient sign indicates that firm size has a positive 
relationship with both risk disclosure quantity and overall quality. This is consistent with the 
assumptions of this paper according to signalling theory. It also concurs with prior empirical 
evidence (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). 
The findings show that high-risk firms do not provide more risk information: DQAN 
firm risk is significantly associated with quantitative information contained in risk disclosures 
at the one percent significance level, while for COV there is a positive association at the ten 
percent level. According to signalling theory, high-risk firms are more likely to disclose more 
risk information in order to avoid market misinterpretation. Previous research has found a 
positive relationship between firm risk and risk disclosures (Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). 
However, the results of this paper do not support prior findings concerning the financial firms 
listed in the Shanghai A-shares market. 
Capital structure is significantly and negatively related to risk disclosure quantity and 
quality. A possible reason for this is that high-leverage firms are at increased risk of bankruptcy, 
and are therefore less willing to disclose information on a frequent basis. Managers in these 
firms may tend to avoid transparency. The negative relationship derived from these results is 
consistent with previous studies (Healy et al., 1999). Furthermore, capital structure is not 
significantly associated with COV and OUL, implying that in the Chinese financial market 
capital structure is not one of the primary indicators for financial listed companies’ disclosure 
levels.  
The BTM ratio is positively correlated with QAN and risk disclosure depth (both in 
terms of quantity and quality). This result is consistent with Cheng et al. (2006), who state that 
a high BTM ratio indicates a higher cost of equity, for which investors require more and 
higher-quality risk-related information. This paper finds no evidence that the BTM ratio is 
significantly associated with the risk disclosure quality indicators for financial firms listed in 
the Shanghai A-shares market. 
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With regard to the variables related to directors – board size (BS) and board 
independence (BI) – we can notice different behaviours. The size of the board seems not to 
affect risk disclosure quantity and quality while the coefficients of board independence are 
negative in five of the six models in Table III and they show significant findings for most of 
them. According to agency theory, the main duty of independent NEDs on the board is to 
monitor the board’s activities. Although previous studies have found a positive relationship 
between board independence and risk disclosure (Abraham and Cox, 2007), the findings of 
this paper provide no evidence of this, confirming what is highlighted in the background 
section in terms of governance mechanisms in the Chinese market. The coefficients of CEO 
duality, Audit Quality and State Ownership are not significant in the period of analysis and 
are also consistent with the period of transition that the Chinese economy and, consequently, 
the financial companies operating there, are experiencing.  
If we consider the aggregate level of disclosure – QAL – we continue to find evidence 
of the patterns previously highlighted: a general positive interaction with size and book to 
market, a moderate negative interaction with capital structure and a marked negative 
interaction with the presence of board independent directors. These findings confirm that at 
this stage of Chinese market development, companies’ characteristics and market indicators 
can capture some of the risk disclosure configurations, while the corporate governance 
indicators do not provide significant results or do not confirm previous studies (as with the 
case of the number of independent directors in the board of directors). 
[Insert Table III] 
[Insert Table IV] 
 
Table V, in Model 1 and Model 2, shows how quality and quantity of risk disclosure 
affect market liquidity. Our results highlight a negative association between bid-ask spread 
and risk disclosure quantity and quality, suggesting that this information is useful as investors 
are likely to consider it while they making their price decisions. Our result is consistent with 
the notion that the Chinese market is complying with new disclosure regulations. Observing 
the significant impact for both QAL and QAN highlights that risk disclosure plays an 
important role in reducing information asymmetry and arguably suggesting that quantity and 
quality are complementary.  
A significant and negative association has been found with the trading volume in the 
time period considered. This may have been driven by trading activity on the market that 
 22 
shows an increasing pattern over the years and a consequent readjustment during and after 
the financial crisis. 
[Insert Table V] 
 
5.3 Further analysis: Subsample analysis and robustness checks  
Table VI and VII reports the results of the subsample analysis for each of the three years 
considered in order to verify the behaviour in the cut-off year (2014), in the year before (2013) 
and in the year after (2015). As for Table IV and V, we present the regression results based 
on the dependent variables of risk disclosure quality and we checked how quality (Model 1) 
and quantity (Model 2) of risk disclosure affect market liquidity. 
We notice that QAL still shows a positive association with size, at the one percent 
significance level in each year, and book to market, at the five percent significance level in 
2013 and 2014 and at the one percent significance level in 2015, while a marked negative 
interaction with the presence of board independent directors is confirmed only for year 2015. 
Furthermore, in each year QAN illustrates a completely similar behaviour highlighting the 
same interactions with size, book to market and board independence for the above mentioned 
years. 
The analysis provided on a yearly basis seems to confirm the general picture of the 
Chinese marker previously discussed. In the year 2013, the results suggest that the quantity 
and the quality of risk information are significantly affecting the market liquidity, suggesting 
that this information is likely to be informative and as a result the investors have responded 
by incorporating such information in their decisions. For the years 2014 (during the crisis) and 
2015 (post the crisis), we do not observe any significant impact for risk disclosure on market 
liquidity, suggesting that risk information in these two years does not contain information 
useful to the market. Our findings for those two years suggest that Chinese firms over the 
period of crisis are likely to provide generic risk information. Collectively, our results indicate 
that our conclusions discussed under Table V are attributed and driven by risk disclosures 
made in the year 2013.  
For the other control variables in the same table, in the year 2013 (before the crisis), 
we find that SPV, TV and BZ are significantly and negatively related to ask-bid spread, 
suggesting these factors are improving the market liquidity. For the year 2014 and the year 
2015, our results suggest that SPV and AQ are the factors that are likely to significantly 
influence the market liquidity in these two extreme years.  
[Insert Table VI] 
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[Insert Table VII] 
We also ran additional tests to see if our results have been affected by endogeneity 
and structural change (Table VIII and Table IX). We replicate our main analyses under Tables 
III, IV and V by running fixed effects regressions. Arguably, these can be considered as a way 
to address the endogeneity problem since they eliminate the influence of time-invariant 
unobservable variables (e.g. Brown et al., 2011). The determinants of QAN and QAL (Table 
VIII) risk disclosure under fixed effects models are broadly consistent with our general 
conclusions under Tables III and IV. Similarly, the conclusions of the impact of risk disclosure 
practices on the market liquidity, based on the fixed effects models (Table IX), are consistent 
with those drawn based on Table V, as previously discussed.  
[Insert Table VIII] 
[Insert Table IX] 
6.	Conclusion	
This paper investigates how firm characteristics influence risk disclosure practices from the 
perspective of quality. It also examines the impact of risk disclosures on market liquidity. The 
sample consisted of financial firms listed in the Shanghai A-shares market, and a manual 
content analysis methodology was adopted. We find that firm size has a positive and 
significant association with risk disclosure quality. This finding is consistent with research by 
Linsley and Shrives (2006), and with both signalling and agency theories regarding managerial 
incentives, indicating that managers in larger firms tend to disclose more high-quality risk 
information to reduce information asymmetry. Furthermore, the results confirm that even in 
situations of political or financial instability (i.e. Marzouk, 2016) it is possible to find a 
relationship between risk disclosure and size. In agreement with previous results (Abraham 
and Cox, 2007; Linsley and Shrives, 2006), this paper finds no association between capital 
structure and risk disclosure. Other firm characteristics (firm risk and BTM ratio) are not 
significantly associated with risk disclosure quality, whereas previous studies have shown a 
positive relationship (Cheng et al., 2006; Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). We conclude that firm 
risk and BTM ratio have no influence on the determination of risk disclosure. For financial 
firms listed in the Shanghai A-shares market, firm size is the most significant influencing factor 
in risk disclosure. As firm size increases, companies tend to disclose more higher-quality risk 
information to satisfy market requirements. 
Our paper confirms previous results in terms of risk disclosure orientation (i.e. Beretta 
and Bozzolan, 2004), in fact the majority of risks disclosed by companies were found to have 
past and present rather than future outlook orientation. In agreement with Elshandidy and 
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Neri (2015), we find that risk disclosure practices have an impact on market liquidity, and 
when we analyse each year we notice that the results are driven by year 2013, while later we 
notice no or little significance for the emerging of the financial crisis. Our results suggest that 
Chinese banks provided the market with less informative risk information during the recent 
crisis of 2014 as managers of those banks despite complying with regulation and providing 
risk information, the content of this information, however, did not provide incremental value 
to the investors. The presence of endogenous variables may have affected the quality of the 
results and we address this potential weakness in section 5.3 (Table VIII and IX) using models 
with fixed effects to deal with this issue and the findings of the paper are still consistent. 
This research has several implications for investors and regulators in China. For 
investors, the findings provide insights into how firm characteristics affect managers’ 
propensity to reveal risk information. Investors may be able to rely on the significant factors 
identified in order to form expectations and evaluate disclosed risk information more 
comprehensively. For regulators in China, such as the CBRC and CSRC, these results draw 
attention to the role of risk disclosure as a component of the capital market system. Firm size 
is the only firm characteristic significantly associated with risk disclosure in annual reports. 
The influence of disclosure on liquidity in 2013 could be an important stimulus for regulators 
in increasing their efforts to improve reporting regulations.  
Risk reporting mitigates information asymmetry between management and external 
shareholders, and may have positive effects on stakeholders’ trust and confidence in a firm’s 
management (Welker, 1995). 
The accuracy of the manual content analysis methodology used in this paper may be 
limited due to its subjectivity. Also, the sample for this model focused only on financial firms 
in China. This means that the results are applicable and useful only within this range. The 
Chinese economy is in transition, which makes it unique compared with economies of 
developed countries.  
In order to overcome the limitations, automated content analysis might be considered 
as an alternative to manual content analysis. The automated method would be able to capture 
more firms over longer periods of time. The problems of subjectivity and labour-intensiveness 
would also be solved through automation. Taking into account the trend for globalisation in 
the Chinese economy, further research might also observe the impact of these variables on 
risk disclosure across different nations. 
In general, this paper confirms previous findings on the Chinese market (Ball et al., 
2000; Zou and Adams, 2008) in which, given a decreasing but still strong state presence, there 
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is higher stock volatility and weak corporate governance, but it will be important to study the 
behaviour of financial companies listed on the Chinese stock market in the following years to 
verify if the disclosure of risks will move to a more substantial level.  
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Table I. 
Descriptive Statistics: Dependent and Independent Variables 
Panel A: Continuous Variables 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. 25% Median 75% 
Risk Disclosure Indicators: 
Quantity (QAN) 300 3.974 0.872 3.401 3.663 4.905 
Coverage (COV) 300 0.632 0.063 0.601 0.657 0.681 
Depth_Quantitative (DQAN) 300 0.721 0.837 0.000 0.693 1.386 
Depth_Qualitative (DQAL) 300 3.954 0.867 3.367 3.651 4.871 
Outlook_Profile (OUL) 300 1.668 0.642 1.386 1.609 2.079 
Quality (QAL) 300 0.002 0.993 -0.721 -0.390 1.180 
 
Reporting Incentives: 
Firms Size (FS) 300 17.27 2.798 15.589 16.735 18.594 
Risk (RS) 300 0.280 0.305 0.105 0.250 0.470 
Capital Structure (CS) 300 1.928 1.902 0.494 1.419 2.663 
Book-to-Market (BTM) 292 3.100 4.302 1.135 1.795 3.100 
Board Size (BS) 300 2.375 0.276 2.303 2.303 2.485 
Board Independence (BI) 300 0.373 0.052 0.333 0.364 0.400 
 
Market Indicators: 
Market Liquidity (ML) 293 0.133 0.884 0.066 0.109 0.176 
Trading Volume (TV) 300 3.661 3.169 1.535 2.844 4.483 
Share Price Volatility (SPV) 300 0.415 0.098 0.355 0.417 0.480
 
Panel B: Dichotomous Variables 
 Yes (%) No (%) 
Ceo Duality (CD) 42 (14%) 258 (86%) 
Audit Quality (AQ) 105 (35%) 195 (65%) 
State Ownership (ST) 139 (47%) 161 (53%) 
Notes: There is no cross-listed firm in the sample list. All financial firms in the Shanghai A-shares market are listed only in 
China. 
Panel A explains the descriptive statistics of all variables. These include risk disclosure, firm characteristics, corporate 
governance and market indicators. For risk disclosure, Quantity (QAN) is calculated as the natural logarithm of the total 
number of sentences containing risk information in annual reports. Coverage (COV) is calculated as the inverse of the 
Herfindahl index value divided by the number of risk topics. Depth_Quantitative (DQAN) is measured as the natural 
logarithm of the number of risk information sentences containing quantitative information. Depth_Qualitative (DQAL) is 
the natural logarithm of the number of risk information sentences containing qualitative information. Outlook_Profile (OUL) 
is measured as the natural logarithm of risk information sentences containing firms’ future actions regarding the identified 
risk. Quality (QAL) is the score of the principal component with the highest eigenvalue calculated from the above five 
indicators. 
The firm characteristic variables are as follows: firm size (FS) is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; risk (RS) is 
measured by the beta, which is the covariance expressing a firm’s market return compared with a 23- to 25-month market 
index; capital structure (CS) is measured as the log of leverage; and book-to-market (BTM) is measured as the ratio of the book 
value of equity divided by its market value. 
Corporate governance includes the following variables: board size (BS) is the total number of directors on the board; board 
independence (BI) is the ratio of independent NEDs to board size; CEO duality (CD) is a dummy variable taking the value of 
1 if an individual holds both the position of CEO and chairman; audit quality (AQ) is a dummy variable taking the value 1 
if the external auditor is one of the Big Four audit firms; and state ownership is a dummy variable taking the value of one if 
the company is owned by the state.. 
Market indicators include: market liquidity (ML), measured as the three-month average of relative spreads from beginning of 
May to end of July; trading volume (TV), measured as the daily trading volume divided by the number of outstanding shares; 
and share price volatility (SPV), measured by the standard deviation of daily stock prices. 
Panel B shows the frequencies of the three dummy variables, CEO duality (CD), audit quality (AQ) and state ownership 
(ST). 
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Table II. 
Correlation Analysis for Continuous Variables 
This table gives the Pearson correlations of the continuous variables for financial firms listed as Shanghai A-shares firms. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous variables 
are winsorised by eliminating observations at the 1st and 99th percentile. Definitions of the above variables are the same as shown in Table I, and as detailed in Appendix 2. *, ** and 
*** indicate significance for two-tailed tests at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) QAN               
(2) COV -.146***              
(3) DQAN .793*** -.171***             
(4) DQAL .999*** -.144*** .779***            
(5) OUL .508*** .037 .409*** .508***           
(6) QAL .983*** -.111** .853*** .979*** .616***          
(7) FS .784*** -.163*** .663*** .783*** .282*** .757***         
(8) RS .180*** .018 .248*** .176*** .003 .188*** .144***        
(9) CS .272*** -.031 .197*** .272*** .185*** .270*** .435*** .024       
(10) BTM -.223*** .064 -.159*** -.224*** -.073 -.206*** -.482*** -.005 -.121**      
(11) BS .617*** -.196*** .568*** .614*** .252*** .610*** .698*** .216*** .278*** -.290***     
(12) BI -.080 .041 -.071 -.078 -.135** -.094* -.028 .020 -.048 -.014 -.236***    
(13) ML -.082 -.036 -.120** -.079 .017 -.089* .068 -.059 .077 -.074 .042 .004   
(14) TV -.230*** .127** -.204*** -.229*** -.062 -.218*** -.401*** -.087* -.148*** .168*** -.335*** -.071 -.221***  
(15) SPV -.455*** .110** -.401*** -.453*** -.162*** -.443*** -.542*** -.246*** -.028 .216*** -.470*** -.013 -.076 .412*** 
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Table III. 
Regression Results for the Various Quality Dimensions of Risk Disclosure 
  QAN COV DQAN DQAL OUL
 Predicted Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat 
FS + .277***  14.15 -.001 -.20 .200*** 8.52 .277*** 14.12 .067*** 2.72 
RS + .114  1.16 .019* 1.56 .305*** 2.60 .102 1.04 -.130 -1.06 
CS + -.042*** -2.48 .002 .74 -.050*** -2.47 -.041*** -2.42 .022 1.03 
BTM ? .042***  5.49 -.001 -.34 .408*** 4.41 .041*** 5.38 .010  1.06 
BS + .043 .27 -.038* -1.86 .279 1.45 .030 .19 .035 .17 
BI + -1.70*** -2.83 .010 .13 -1.21* -1.68 -1.66*** -2.77 -1.57** -2.09 
CD - .038 .46 .002 .20 -.050 -.50 .043 .52 -.118 -1.13 
AQ + .062 .77 -.013 -1.27 .110 1.14 .059 .074 -.020 -.19 
ST ? -0.045 -.72 -.003 -.40 0.067 .89 -.052 -.84 -.041 -.52 
Intercept  -.372 -.87 .725*** 13.36 -3.13*** -6.12 -.355 -.83 1.01** 1.89 
       
Adjusted R-squared  0.6779 0.0268 0.5031 0.6745 0.0832 
F-statistics  69.04 1.89 33.74 68.00 3.93 
Observation  292 292 292 292 292 
Mean VIF  1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 
Max VIF  3.77 3.77 3.77 3.77 3.77 
This table shows the impact of firm characteristics and control variables on risk disclosure quantity and quality. The R-squared value describes the model’s ability to account for 
changes in each risk quality indicator. Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) quantifies the severity of multicollinearity in an ordinary least squares regression analysis. Since the mean and 
max VIF for all variables is less than 10, there is no multicollinearity problem. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorised by eliminating observations 
at the 1st and 99th percentile. Definitions of the above variables are identical to those given in Table I, and as detailed in Appendix 2.  
 
 
 37 
Table IV. 
Regression Results for the Quality of Risk Disclosure 
   QAL
 Predicted Coef. T-stat
FS                       + .299*** 12.58 
RS                       + .153 1.29 
CS                       + -.041** -2.01 
BTM                       ? .048*** 5.19 
BS                       + .104 0.54 
BI                       + -2.10*** -2.88 
CD                        - -.010 -.10 
AQ                       + .065 .67 
ST                        ? -0.035 -.46 
Intercept  -4.75*** -9.18 
   
Adjusted R-squared  0.6336 
F-statistics  56.91 
Observation  292 
Mean VIF  1.68 
Max VIF  3.77 
This table displays the impact of firm characteristics and control variables on risk disclosure quality. Variance 
Inflation Factors (VIF) quantifies the severity of multicollinearity in an ordinary least squares regression 
analysis. Since the mean and max VIF for all variables is less than 10, no multicollinearity problem exists. To 
mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorised by eliminating observations at the 
1st and 99th percentile. Definitions of the above variables are the same as those given in Table I, and as 
detailed in Appendix 2.  
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Table V. 
OLS Regressions of the Impact of Risk Disclosure Quality and Quantity on Market 
Liquidity 
  Market Liquidity 
Model 1
QAL 
Model 2  
QAN 
 Predicted Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat 
QAL ? -.024*** -2.64  
QAN ? -.029*** -2.72 
FS + .006 1.29 .007* 1.47 
RS + -.012 -.67 -.013 -.70 
CS + .002 .58 .001 .49 
BTM ? -.000 -.06 .000 .01 
SPV - -.037 -.54 -.036 -.52 
TV - -.005*** -2.92 -.005*** -2.91 
BS + .008 .28 .008 .26 
BI + -.092 -.83 -.094 -.85 
CD - -.017 -1.09 -.015 -1.02 
AQ + -.016 -1.10 -.015 -1.07 
ST ? .002 .17 .001 .13 
Intercept  .086 .81 .185** 1.93 
   
Adjusted R-squared  0.0575 0.0590 
F-statistics  2.44 2.48
Observation  285 285
Mean VIF  2.05 2.14
Max VIF  6.68 7.27
This table shows the results concerning the impact of risk disclosure quality and quantity on market 
liquidity for financial firms listed in the Shanghai A-shares market. Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
quantifies the severity of multicollinearity in an ordinary least squares regression analysis. Since the 
mean and max VIF for all variables is less than 10, no multicollinearity problem exists. To mitigate the 
influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorised by eliminating observations at the 1st and 
99th percentile. Definitions of the above variables are identical to those given in Table I, and as detailed 
in Appendix 2.  
 
  
 39 
Table VI. 
Regression Results for the Quality and Quantity of Risk Disclosure spread by year 
 
 
 2013 2014 2015 
 Model 1 
QAL 
Model 2 
QAN 
M Model 2 
QAN Model 1 QAL  Model 2 Q
Predict
ed Coef. T-stat 
Co
ef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat
FS 
+ .262*** 5.90 .248*** 6.64 
.331*** 6.67 .297*** 7.55 .321*** 9.01 .299*** 9.88
RS + .347 1.40 .269 1.29 .280 1.25 .205 1.16 .143 .75 .060 .37
CS + -.024 -.65 -.023 -.74 -.045 -1.16 -.048 -1.57 -.053* -1.63 -.054** -1.93
BTM 
? .046** 2.38 .040** 2.50 
.046** 2.09 .040** 2.32 .056*** 4.37 .047*** 4.34
BS + .237 .67 .199 .67 .125 .33 .022 .07 -.234 -.75 -.227 -.85
BI + -.130 -.10 .268 .24 -2.06 -1.44 -1.88* -1.66 -4.42*** -3.74 -3.800*** -3.79
CD - .059 .26 .140 .73 -.019 -.11 .033 .24 -.083 -.54 -.045 -.35
AQ + .089 .47 .083 .53 -.115 -.64 -.048 -.34 .127 .82 .074 .56
T ? -0.046 -.33 -.042 -.36 -.146 -1.03 -.119 -1.06 .067 .53 .012 .11
ntercept 
 -
5.25*** -5.58 -1.05 -1.32 
-
5.180**
* 
-5.60 -.498 -.68 -3.61*** -4.13 .627 .85
            
Adjusted 
R-squared 
 
0.5788  0.6319 0.6164  0.6713 
 
0.6872  0.7133 
F-statistics  15.66  19.31 18.14  22.78  24.68  27.82 
Observatio  97  97 97  97  98  98 
Mean VIF  1.74  1.74 1.91  1.91  1.69  1.69 
Max VIF  3.80  3.80 4.92  4.92  3.47  3.47 
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Table VII. 
OLS Regressions of the Impact of Risk Disclosure on Market Liquidity spread by year 
 
  
Market Liquidity 
  2013 2014 2015 
  Model 1 
QAL 
Model 2 
QAN 
Model 1  
QAL 
Model 2 
QAN Model 1 QAL  
Model 2 
QAN 
 
Predict
ed Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat 
QAL ? -.050*** -3.34   .001 .07   -.010 -.71   
QAN 
?   -.067*** -3.84 
  -.003 -.27   -.013 -.75 
FS + .006 .81 .010 1.24 -.000 -.05 .001 .16 -.002 -.28 -.001 -.19 
RS  -.035 -1.01 -.034 -1.03 -.018 -.86 -.017 -.82 -.045* -1.66 -.046* -1.71 
CS + .006 1.14 .006 1.13 .004 1.10 .004 1.03 .008* 1.82 .008* 1.79 
BTM ? .001 .54 .002 .73 .000 0.14 .000 .22 -.002 -1.12 -.002 -1.11 
SPV 
- -.384*** -3.11 -.398*** -3.27 
-.185* -1.80 -.184* -1.80 -.372*** -3.54 -.373*** -3.55 
TV - -.007*** -2.41 -.007** -2.22 -.003 -1.14 -.003 -1.07 -.002 -.87 -.002 -.86 
BS + -.106** -2.14 -.102** -2.10 .024 0.69 .025 .70 .034 .77 .035 .77 
BI + -.166 -.89 -.137 -.74 -.143 -1.08 -.151 -1.13 -.038 -.22 -.041 -.24 
CD - .014 .46 .021 .68 -.008 -.50 -.008 -.51 -.003 -.15 -.003 -.14 
AQ + .010 .38 .011 .43 -.025* -1.45 -.025* -1.45 -.036** -1.73 -.037* -1.76 
ST ? .004 .23 .004 .23 .000 .02 -.000 -.00 .009 .54 .009 .51 
Interce
pt 
 .580*** 3.18 .771*** 4.66 .172 1.25 .164 1.33 .268* 1.69 .313 2.19 
              
Adjust
ed R-
square
d 
 
0.2306  0.2591 
 
.0667 
  
0.0675 
  
0.1565 
  
0.1570 
 
F-
statisti
cs 
 
3.35  3.74 
1.56  1.57  2.45  2.46  
Observ
ation 
 95  95 95  95  95  95  
Mean 
VIF 
 2.10  2.18 2.43  2.53  2.28  2.38  
Max 
VIF 
 6.24  6.65 8.50  9.19  7.65  8.42  
This table shows the results concerning the impact of risk disclosure quality and quantity on market 
liquidity for financial firms listed in the Shanghai A-shares market on yearly basis. Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIF) quantifies the severity of multicollinearity in an ordinary least squares regression analysis. 
Since the mean and max VIF for all variables is less than 10, no multicollinearity problem exists. To 
mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorised by eliminating observations 
at the 1st and 99th percentile. Definitions of the above variables are identical to those given in Table 
I, and as detailed in Appendix 2.  
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Table VIII. 
Fixed Regression Results for the Quantity and Quality of Risk Disclosure 
 
  QAL                               QAN
 Predicted Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat 
FS + .184*** 7.30 .188*** 6.26 
RS + .112 1.11 .070 .58 
CS + -.016 -.83 -.020 -.87 
BTM ? .006 .82 .009 .94 
BS + .162 .86 .220 .98 
BI + -.720 -1.25 -.975 -1.42 
CD - .091 1.01 .129 1.20 
AQ + .091 1.00 .068 .62 
ST ? -0.013 -.17 -.012 -.12 
Intercept  .611 1.21 -3.46*** -5.78 
    
Adjusted R-squared  0.4534 0.3810 
F-statistics  16.77 12.45 
Observation  292 292 
Using the fixed-effect estimations, this table displays the impact of firm characteristics and control variables 
on risk disclosure quality and quantity Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) quantifies the severity of 
multicollinearity in an ordinary least squares regression analysis. Since the mean and max VIF for all variables 
is less than 10, no multicollinearity problem exists. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous 
variables are winsorised by eliminating observations at the 1st and 99th percentile. Definitions of the above 
variables are the same as those given in Table I, and as detailed in Appendix 2. The significance indicators are 
the same as those in Tables III and IV. 
 
 
  
 42 
Table IX. 
Estimates of fixed effects of the Impact of Risk Disclosure on Market Liquidity 
 
  Market Liquidity 
  Model 1
QAL 
Model 2  
QAN 
 Predicted Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat 
QAL ? -.029** -2.00  
QAN ? -.026* -1.51 
FS  .006 .92 .005 .78 
RS + -.007 -.32 -.007 -.29 
CS + -.001 -.33 -.001 -.29 
BTM ? .001 .060 .001 .54 
SPV - .325*** 3.77 .321*** 3.71 
TV - -.001 -.51 -.001 -.54 
BS + .072* 1.62 .071* 1.57 
BI + -.059 -.44 -.051 -.38 
CD - -.016 -.74 -.018 -.80 
AQ + -.001 -.04 -.000 -.02 
ST ? -.011 -.59 -.011 -.59 
Intercept  -.242* -1.66 -.123 -.92 
   
Adjusted R-squared  0.1231 0.1145 
F-statistics  2.01 1.85
Observation  285 285 
 
Using the fixed-effect estimations, this table shows the results concerning the impact of risk disclosure 
quality and quantity on market liquidity for financial firms listed in the Shanghai A-shares market. 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) quantifies the severity of multicollinearity in an ordinary least squares 
regression analysis. Since the mean and max VIF for all variables is less than 10, no multicollinearity 
problem exists. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorised by 
eliminating observations at the 1st and 99th percentile. Definitions of the above variables are identical 
to those given in Table I, and as detailed in Appendix 2. The significance indicators are consistent with 
those in Table V. 
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Appendix	 1.	 Example	 of	 Measurement	 of	 the	 Risk	 Disclosure	
Quality	Score	
This appendix uses The Pacific Securities Company Limited annual report 2014 as 
example to demonstrate the calculation of the indicators of risk disclosure quality. 
 
(1) Quantity (QAN) = ln(total number of sentences contained risk disclosure) – 
Disclosure score = Quantity = ln(131) = 4.88 
 
(2) Coverage (COV)= [(1/H)/Number of main risk topics] 
The risk disclosures of The Pacific Securities Company Limited in its 2014 
annual report are divided into three main risk topics: 
Financial risks: 50 sentences 
Damage risks: 0 sentences 
Risk management: 81 sentences 
Total: 131 sentences 
- Herfindahl index = H = (50/131)2 + (0/131)2+ (81/131)2 = 0.764 
- Disclosure score = Coverage = (1/0.764)/3 = 0.44 
 
(3) Semantic properties of risk disclosure 
Example sentences: 
 
 DQAL DQAN OUL
1) 
2015年,公司将进一步树立全面风险管理意识，注重发挥事前、事
中、事后的全链条合规管理职能，建立从后台管理部门到一线业
务部门。 
 
The company will further establish comprehensive risk management 
awareness, pay attention to before, during and after periods in 2015. Also 
the company will focus on compliance of management functions. 
✓  ✓ 
2) 
母公司的净资本为 54.64亿元，净资本与股东权益的比例为
85.47%，公司资产质量优良，各项财务及业务风险控制指标符合
《证券公司风险控制指标管理办法》的有关规定。 
Net capital of the parent company was 5.464 billion yuan, the ratio of net 
capital and shareholders’ equity was 85.47%, good quality assets of the 
company; the financial and business risk control indicators comply with 
the relevant provisions of the “The Management of Securities Risk 
Control Indicators”. 
 ✓  
 
Therefore, in the 2014 annual report of The Pacific Securities Company 
Limited, the scores are as follows: 
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DEPTH_QUALITATIVE (DQAL) = 125 
- Disclosure score = ln(125) = 4.83 
DEPTH_QUANTITATIVE (DQAN)= 6 
- Disclosure score = ln(6) = 1.79 
OUTLOOK_PROFILE (OUL)= 21 
- Disclosure score = ln(21) = 3.04 
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Appendix 2. Summary of variable definitions, measures and sources 
 
Varia
ble Definition and measures Source 
Panel A: Continuous variables   
Risk disclosure incentives   
QAN 
Quantity refers to the amount of sentences containing risk information and 
is calculated as the natural logarithm of the total number of sentences 
containing risk information in annual reports 
Thomson 
One 
Banker / 
Company 
website 
COV 
Coverage is the coverage of risk information contained in the annual 
reports and is calculated as the inverse of the Herfindahl index value 
divided by the number of risk topics 
Thomson 
One 
Banker / 
Company 
website 
DQA
N 
Depth_Quantitative includes the quantity risk-related information about 
expected future performance and is measured as the natural logarithm of 
the number of risk information sentences containing quantitative 
information 
Thomson 
One 
Banker / 
Company 
website 
DQA
L 
Depth_Qualitative includes the quality risk-related information about 
expected future performance and is the natural logarithm of the number of 
risk information sentences containing qualitative information 
Thomson
One 
Banker / 
Company 
website 
OUL 
Outlook_Profile refers to information about the risk management 
approach and is measured as the natural logarithm of risk information 
sentences containing firms’ future actions regarding the identified risk 
Thomson 
One 
Banker / 
Company 
website 
QAL 
Composite is the score of the principal component with the highest 
eigenvalue calculated from the above five indicators 
Thomson 
One 
Banker / 
Company 
website 
Reporting incentives   
FS Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets Datastream
RS 
Risk is measured by the beta, which is the covariance expressing a firm’s 
market return compared with a 23- to 25-month market index Datastream
CS Capital structure is measured as the log of leverage Datastream
BTM 
Book-to-market is measured as the ratio of the book value of equity divided 
by its market value Datastream
BS Board size is the total number of directors on the board 
Orbis/Ann
ual report 
BI Board independence is the ratio of independent NEDs to board size 
Orbis/Ann
ual report 
Market indicators   
ML 
Market liquidity, measured as the three-month average of relative spreads 
from beginning of May to end of July Datastream
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TV 
Trading volume, measured as the daily trading volume divided by the 
number of outstanding shares Datastream
SPV 
Share price volatility, measured by the standard deviation of daily stock 
prices Datastream
Panel B: Dicotomous variables   
CD 
CEO duality is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if an individual holds 
both the position of CEO and chairman 
Orbis/Ann
ual 
report/Co
mpany 
website 
AQ 
Audit quality is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the external auditor 
is one of the Big Four audit firms 
Orbis/Ann
ual 
report/Co
mpany 
website 
ST 
State ownership is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the company is 
ownded by the chinese state 
Orbis/Ann
ual 
report/Co
mpany 
website 
This table provides the definition and measures of risk reporting, firm, market and 
corporate governance characteristics. It also provides the source of each variable. To 
mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorised by 
eliminating observations at the 1st and 99th percentile.   
 
